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The recent period of inflation resulted in a
dramatic rise in yields on long-term debt securi-
ties. The rise in yields was accompanied by a
change in the spreads between different grades
of corporate and municipal bonds, and in the
spreads between yields on prime-grade corpo-
rates and yields on long-term U.S. Government
securities. In this paperwe investigate the ques-
tion of whether the bond markets were "effi-
cient" in establishing yield differentials between
different grades of bonds and between prime
corporate and long-term Government bonds. In
addition, we consider to what extent "inefficien-
cies" were related to the recent period of infla-
tion, more specifically, related to the unantici-
pated portion of the recent inflation.
Our analysis suggests that while the market
was efficient in removing any systematic profits
available by arbitraging across different grades
of securities (for example, between Aaa and
Baa bonds), the market was not efficient in
establishing the differential between prime grade
corporates and long-term Government bonds.
The significant rise in unanticipated inflation
caused the market to demand much greater pre-
miums for prime corporates over Governments
than the underlying risk would have justified.
Long-term Governments appear to have lost at
least in part their role as a "safe asset" in long-
term portfolios, and this has impaired the mar-
ket's ability to determine the appropriate spread
of prime corporates over long-term Govern-
ments.
Defining capital market "efficiency"
The concept of capital-market efficiency in
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modern finance theory concerns the extent to
which the price of a security "reflects" the "in-
formation" the "market" has available to it. An
efficient market is one in which the price always
incorporates all of the information available to
the market.
1 It is obvious that this concept of
efficiency is a loose one and needs to be more
rigorously statedinorder to make it operational.
(See Appendix I for a technical treatment of the
concept of market efficiency.) There is, how-
ever, a more intuitive corollary to this notion of
capital market efficiency. Ifa market is efficient
it should not be possible for participants to ex-
ploit the available information to make above-
normal profits on the basis of some "trading
rule." More precisely, an efficient market is one
in which the history of the price of the security,
other than the current price, provides no useful
information for knowing what the expected
value of tomorrow's (or next year's) price will
be. All the information is "fully reflected" in
the currentprice. This notionof efficiency leads
to the equation of an efficient marketwith a con-
cept of a "fair game," in which there is an equal
expectation of gain or loss-or in which the
expectation is for a zero gain.
Tests of the efficient market hypothesis are
implicitly "joint tests," that is, they are both a
test of the hypothesis that the market is efficient
and a·test of a particular hypothesis regarding
how investors' expected returns on the security
are formed to establish equilibrium in the mar-
ket for the security. This complication creates
some ambiguity in deriving implications regard-
ing the efficiency of markets. If the hypothesis
is rejected, it may imply either (1) that the
market is efficient and that the theory of the
formation of the expected return is in error orChart 1


















of securities in the same market (e.g., Aaa vs.
Baacorporates).
Measuring risk spreads
A glance at the postwar data indicates that
the Baa-Aaa "quality differential" was very
stable for the corporate sector and fairly stable
for the municipal market, except for the last few
years. The Baaand Aaamarket yields and their
spreads are shown in Charts 1 and 2, while the
numerical averages, standard deviations, and
coefficients of variation (standard deviation
divided by the mean) are shown in Tables 1
and 2.
Between the 1950's andthe 1960's, corporate
bond yields rose significantly but the average
Baa-Aaacorporateyield spread and its variation
remained almost unchanged, averaging about
65 basis points, with a standard deviation of 16
basis points. This quality yield differential re-
mained stable even though both Baa and Aaa
corporate rates rose by about 170 basis points
during the 1960's. Assuming an efficient mar-
Chart 2














(2) the reverse, that the expected return model
is correct but the market is inefficient.
Our interest in the efficient markets hypoth-
esis first centers on the question of whether the
yield spread between various "grades" of rated
bonds adequately incorporates all the market
information which reflects substantive differ-
ences in the quality of the securities. To test
this hypothesis, we assume at the start that the
underlying quality differential between Aaa and
Baa bonds remained constant in the corporate
and municipal markets in the period since 1950.
Thus, our test of the efficiency of these markets
is made "conditional" on this assumption. In-
terpretation of our statistical results should re-
call this conditionality. Simply stated, our argu-
ment is that if bond markets are operating effi-
ciently, it should not be possible to gain arbi-
trage profits systematically between different
security markets (e.g., corporate vs. Govern-
ments), and similarly, it should not be possible
to arbitrage systematically between risk classes
18ket, we can interpret this stability as indicating
an unchanged quality differential over this
period.
Market yields on municipals rose about 100
basis points during the 1960's, while the Baa-
Aaa yield differential narrowed appreciably,
from 95 to 61 basis points, but with greater
relative variability. These data would indicate,
assuming an efficient market and constant qual-
ity of rating services, that the average quality of
Baa issues may have improved significantly,
relative to Aaa municipals, over this.period.
The evidence concerning the quality differen-
tial between Aaa and Baa bonds gives rise to a
question ofmarket efficiency. Did the markets
in the 1950-69 period utilize information in an
efficient manner, such that knowledge of past
movements in the Baa-Aaa differential provided
little or no help in predicting each subsequent
monthly change in the differential? To answer
this question, we should consider the auto-cor-
relations of the Baa-Aaa market yield spread
over that period, assuming constancy in the un-
derlying Baa-Aaa quality differential.
Table 3 shows the autocorrelations for twelve
lagged periods, although 50 autocorrelations
were estimated.
2 The test statistics indicate that
there was very little serial dependence in the
changes in the Baa-Aaa yield spread during the
1950-69 period. The autocorrelations were all
quite low, and only the first-order autocorrela-
tion in the corporate bond spreads was statisti-
cally significant. This latter result is not unex-
pected, however. As Holbrook Working has
shown, the monthly averaging of daily random








Market Yield Yield Spread: Baa-Aaa
Standard Coefficient
Period Aaa Baa Mean Deviation ofVariation
1919-1929
~ ,. 6.72 1.61 0.51 0.31 J.ll
1930-1939 3.89 6.32 2.43 0.98 0.40
1940-1949 2.71 3.73 1.02 0.46 0.45
1950-1959 3.30 3.93 0.63 0.16 0.25
1960-1969 5.00 5.65 0.65 0.16 0.24
1970-1975 III 7.90 8.97 1.06 0.29 0.27
Table 2




Market Yield Yield Spread: Baa·Aaa
Standard Coefficient
Period Aaa Baa Mean Deviation of Variation
------_._~
1950-1959 2.34 3.29 0.95 0.13 0.13
1960-1969 3.59 4.20 0.61 0.16 0.27
1970-1975 5.61 6.31 I 0.70 0.25 0.35
Since the remaining autocorrelations were all
small and statistically insignificant, we can con-
clude that past changes in the Baa-Aaa spread
-forboth the corporate and municipal markets
-were of no use in predicting the change in the
spread. This can be interpreted, loosely, as say-
ing that people cannot profitably arbitrage be-
tween different grades of securities in the same
market.
Decomposition ofriskexposure
The notion of risk is a relative one. The Baa-
Aaa spread represents only the marginal risk-
not the total risk-that a Baa bond holder
Table3
Estimated Autocorrelations forthe Change
in the Baa·Aaa Yield Spread
1950-1969
Lag: (months) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Corporate Bonds
Municipal Bonds
0.20* 0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02
0.07 -0.08 -0.13 -0.08 -0.10 0.00 -0.04 0.12
0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.00
0.12 -0.03 -0.06 -0.12
"Coefficient is more than twice its standard error.
Box-Pierce Q-statistic: Municipals 50.95; Corporates 40.49
Critical:X' 95% value: 67.5
19assumes by not holding a prime grade bond. A
Baa bond holder's total risk can only be mea-
sured with reference to the most default-free
long-term debt instrument, a government bond.
To capture this total risk, we divide the differ-
ential between the market yield on a Baa bond
and that on a .long-term U.S. Government
security into two components-the spread be-
tween a Baa and Aaa, and the spread between
a Aaa and a long-term U.S. Government.
(Table 4) The sum of these two components
we have defined as the "total risk differential,"
on the grounds that this can only be defined
with respect to a "safe" long-term asset, in terms
of default risk .and marketability.
Given this definition of "total risk differen-
tial," the Baa-Aaa differential can be regarded
as equivalent to a Baa default premium only if
the two assets are alike in every other respect
(marketability, price variability, and so on).
Although the total risk differential may reflect
other institutional factors, such as liquidity and
call protection, we assume that it is dominated
by default considerations. The differential be-
tween the Aaa corporate bond and the long-
term U.S. Government bond-the premium
over the safe asset-can then be thought of as
the additional risk one assumes by purchasing
the highest quality corporate long-term debt.
Let us refer to the Baa-Aaa spread as the "Baa
quality premium." The decomposition of the
"total risk differential" provides some interest-
ing insights into the risk one assumes with a
Baa corporate security.
Table 4 indicates that, between the 1940's
and the 1950's, the total risk differential be-
tween a Baa corporate bond and a long-term
government security declined from 128 basis
points to 94 basis points. Most of this decline
was due to a 29 b.p. decline in the "Baa quality
premium," compared to only a 6 b.p. decline in
the average Aaa risk premium over the "safe
asset," U.S. Government securities. During the
1960's there was only a modest change in these
spreads. However, the 1970-75 period wit-
nessed a dramatic swing inthese premiums, with
the total risk differential growing from 114 to
262 basis points. But in this case, most of the
higher differential (104 b.p.) was due to an
increase in the Aaariskpremium over long-term
governments, while only 44 basis points was
due to the increased risk of holding a Baa cor-
porate security. The recent rise in the risk
structure of interest rates thus seems to reflect
the perceived greater risk of corporate securities
generally, rather than the greater riskiness of
less than premium rated corporate securities.
After the mid-1960's, quite atypically for the
postwar period, the risk premium between Aaa
corporates and long-term Governments began
to increase greatly and with much more varia-
bility (Chart 3). Indeed, in early 1968, this
risk premium exceeded the Baa-Aaa quality
differential for the first time in the postwar
period. This shift may be best understood in
terms of an increased public demand for greater
risk premiums on corporate securities. As
Edward S. Shaw has emphasized in a previous
Table 4
Decomposition of Risk Exposure
Corporate Bonds
(basis points)
Baa-Aaa Aaa-U.S. Gov't Baa-U.S. Gov't
"Baa Quality Premiums" "Aaa Risk Premium" "Total Risk Differentia'"
Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient
Periods Means Deviations of Variation Means Deviations of Variation Means Deviations of Variation
1941 ~ 1949 92 37 040 37 13 .35 128 44 .34
1950-1959 63 16 .25 31
~ 7 .23 94 21 .23
1960-1975 81 31 .38 89 57 .64 169 84 .49
1960 1969 64 16 .25 50 25 .51 114 37 .33
1970 - 1975 108 31 .28 154 30 .19 262 55 .21
20article in this Review,4 price inflation can play
havoc with so-called "safe assets"-i.e., assets
which have real yields with small unanticipated
variance. The existence of safe assets normally
permits risk-averse individuals to increase their
expected returns by forming portfolios of safe
and risky assets. In Shaw's words, "accumula-
tion of safe assets is complementary with ac-
cumulation of productive and risky assets, re-
ducing the supply price of savings to riskier
uses."5 However, the gradual erosion of U.S.
Government securities as safe assets during the
late 1960's and 1970's, due to a rise in unan-
ticipated inflation, led investors to demand
greater premiums for purchasing corporate se-
curities rather than Governments.
The hitherto strong correlation between dif-
ferent types of bond rates also disappeared dur-
ing the 1970's. Long-term Governments and
Aaa corporates were very strongly correlated
in the two preceding decades, with a simple cor-
relation of 0.98, but this correlation fell to a
modest 0.34 in the 1970-75 period. A simiiar
but less dramatic fall occurred in the municipal
bond market. In the 1970's Aaa corporatebond
holders demanded three times' the 50-basis
point premium that these securities commanded
over long-term Governments during the 1960's.
There are a number of possible explanations for
this phenomenon, but the very rapid (and atypi-
cal) rise in unanticipated inflation may be cru-
ciaL The rate of unanticipated inflation reached
8 percent in 1974, and this increased uncer-
tainty was reflected in the premium demanded
on corporate securities.
The risk premium between Aaa corporates
and long-term Governments went from an aver-
age of 50 basis points in the 1960's to 154 basis
points in the first half of the 1970's. In contrast,
the Baa-Aaa corporate spread increased by only
44 basis points between these periods. Thus,
the capital markets in recent years have been
demanding greater interest yields on Baa cor-
porate securities, more because of the loss ofthe
safe asset than because of the increased in-
herent risk of Baa bonds.
Our previous results concerning the 1950-69
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bonds but was inefficient in capturing the risk
differential between Aaa bonds and long-term
Governments. This supports Shaw's suggestion
that the rise of "dirty inflation" (i.e., unantici-
pated inflation) helped distort relative financial
prices in recent years.
A rough estimate of unanticipated inflation
may be obtained by the following procedure.
Following a definition developed by Irving
Fisher, we may calculate the anticipated portion
of price inflation by subtracting an estimate of
the real rate of interest from the nominal (mar-
ket) rate of interest-specifically, by subtract-
ing Standard and Poor's composite dividend
yield from S&P's high grade bond yield. Then
we can obtain a rough estimate of "unantici-
pated inflation"7 by subtracting this estimated
"anticipated rate of inflation" from the observed
inflation rate calculated from the Consumer
PriceIndex.
Chart 4
Unanticipated Inflation and Aaa Corporate Risk Premium
r..",,~~:::~~~ B_a.-,is points
gested that the capital markets operated effi-
cientlyin incorporatingavailable information in
the differential, so that knowledge of past
changes in the Baa-Aaa spread was of little
more use than knowledge of the most recent
change. Was the market equally efficient in re-
moving the potential for arbitrage profits be-
tween U.S. Governments and Aaa corporates?
The autocorrelations for the change in the Aaa-
U.S. Government spread have a substantial
amount of statistical significance, and the chi-
square statistic rejects thehypothesis of random
fluctuations in the monthly change in this series
(Table 5). Similar results were evident for the
municipal-bond market. This evidence sup-
ports the argument that the loss of the safe asset
during the late 1960's and 1970's led to ineffi-
cient capital markets.
For most periods, the capital markets effi-
ciently used available information in determin-
ing the Baa-Aaa corporate and municipal bond
spreads. Some evidence suggests, however, that
the market had difficulty properly determining
the premium between Aaa bonds and long-term
Governments. As we stated earlier, autocorre-
lation results provide only tentative information
on capital-market efficiency, because they are
really a joint test ofthe hypotheses thatthe mar-
ket is efficient and that the true underlying risk
premium between the two securities is constant.
Significant autocorrelations may indicate that
either or both of these hypotheses are false, so
that we are unable, with these simple statistics,
to distinguish which of them is rejected.
6 How-
ever, our evidence indicates (at least condition-
ally) that the capital market properly assessed
default-risk differentials between Aaa and Baa
TableS
Estimated Autocorrelations of the Change in the
Aaa-Iong-term U.S. Government Yield Spread
1950-1969
Lag (months) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Aaa-U.S. Gov't -0.17* -0.27* 0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.16* -0.10 -0.16* 0.15* -0.05 -0.05 0.12
*Coefficient is more than twice its standard error.
Box-Pierce Q-statistic: 117.6
Critical):' 95% value: 67.5
22Table 6 provides estimates of unanticipated
inflation for the 1960-75 period, together with
thespread between the Aaa corporate bond rate
and the long-term U.S. Government bond rate.
TheAaacorporate riskpremiumincreasedfrom
35 basis points between 1960 and 1964, when
the average rate of unanticipated inflation was
only 0.06 percent, to 154 basis points between
1970 and 1975, when unanticipated inflation
grew to over 2 percent annually.
Chart 4 shows that the Aaa corporate risk
premium over long-term U.S. governments re-
mained quite stable during the early 1960's, but
then rose rapidly when the rate of unanticipated
inflation began to climb after 1965. However,
the two series did not always move together.
Thefall in unanticipated inflation between 1970
and 1972failed to show up inthe Aaacorporate
riskpremium until 1973. But then, as unantici-
pated inflation increased, the Aaa corporate
risk premium responded as expected by rising
rapidly. From the third quarter of 1973 to the
fourth quarter of 1974 the Aaa risk premium
rose by 104 basis points, reflecting the ll-per-
cent increase in unanticipated inflation which
beganin 1972.
The unprecedented demand for risk premi-
ums on high-rated corporate bonds is yet an-
otherexample ofthe so-called"rushfor quality"
seen in both short-term and long-term debt
marketsinrecent years. Unanticipated inflation
is but one ingredient in the premium demanded
by the holders of private debt instruments.
Nonetheless, the distortion in financial markets
caused by unanticipated inflation, here de-
scribed in terms ofthe efficiency of capital mar-
Table 6






















kets, deserves to be considered as an important
cost ofthe recent U.S. inflation.
Conclusion
The period of tranquil stability in bond mar-
kets experienced during the 1950's and early
1960's was replaced by an entirely different
situation after 1965. Yield spreads increased
between different grades of bonds in both the
corporate and municipal market, as did their
variability. While the bond markets apparently
were efficient in incorporating available infor-
mation in the spread between Aaa and Baa se-
curities, this was not the case for the market's
determination of the appropriate spread be-
tween Aaa corporates and long-term U.S. Gov-
ernment bonds. The difficulty in determining
this spread appears to be related to the unprece-
dented rise in unanticipated inflation experi-
enced since the late 1960's.
It should be emphasized that the conclusions
of this paper are strongly conditional on the
assumption of long-term constancy of the un-
derlying risks between different grades of rated
securities-a somewhat questionable assump-
tion in light of the severity of the recent reces-
sion and inflation. Further work needs to be
done on an alternative hypothesis, namely, that
capital markets were efficient throughout the
post-war period in assessing risk differentials,
butthatthe underlyingrisk differentials widened
significantly because of substantive and perva-
sive changes in the economic environment. This
Bank's Research Department is continuing an
extensive study of the impact of these changes
on the capital market's perception of financial
risks.
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Yield data for Aaa and Baa corporate bonds
andthelong-term U.S. Governmentbonds were
obtained from the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Banking and Monetary Statistics, and the Sup-
plement to Banking and Monetary Statistics
(M:()lley Rates and Security Markets). All are
Federal Reserve publications.
Dataon municipal yields were obtained from
Moody'sMunicipal and Government Manual.
While the above concepts of market efficiency
may appear somewhat esoteric, they are im-
portant concepts for enhancing our general un-
derstanding of financial markets. Equation (1),
for example, states that in an efficient market
the current price is an unbiased estimate of the
future price. It also implies that successive
changes in the price of the security ought to be
uncorrelated, that is, statistically unrelated. In-
deed, a wealth of information on stock-market
prices indicates thatthe equitymarket is efficient
under these definitions. In recent years, a
number of non - technical publications have
stressed this notion that prices in the stock mar-
ket follow a "random walk;" that is, successive
price changes are independent.8 Although this
concept is not formally equivalent to the state-
ment that the stock market is an efficient mar-
ket, it says something very similar. The general
point is the same-the market incorporates
price information in such a manner that one
'cannot exploit this information in a systematic




Equation (1) states that the mathematical ex-
pectations (denoted by E) of the price (P) to
prevail j periods hence, Pt+j, given our knowl-
edge of the current price and the previous
history of this price, is precisely equal to the
expected value of the price j periods hence given
only the knowledge of the current price. In
other words, knowledge of past prices is irrele-
vant. Alternative definitions ofmarket efficiency
differ primarily by extending the range of in-
formation upon which the expectation of the
future price in (1) is made conditional. In
addition, a more concrete notion of market
efficiency would suggest that the probability
density function of the future security price,
given the market's set of information, is equal to
the true density function of the future price
given the available information.
The efficient market theory, however, says
more than (1). Let us define the information
available to the market at time t as Zt. Then, if
the market is efficient,
LlP* . :: p* . - P t+J t+J t
From (2) and (3) it is clear that the expected
E(P* t+j IZt ) =P t
where the * denotes that the future price is a
random variable; that is, not known with cer-
tainty. If we define the change in the future
price from time t, we have
The Concept ofEfficientMarkets
Oneform ofan efficient market (the so-called price change, given the information available,
"weak form"), in which the "information" is Zt, is equalto zero,
only the history of the price itself, can be stated
quite simply as:
E(P t+j IPt'Pt- 1 ,Pt- 2,···) = E(Pt+j IPt) (1)
24